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Abstract
We model competition between two firms selling identical goods to customers who arrive in the market stochastically.
Shoppers choose where to purchase based upon both price and the time cost associated with waiting for service. One seller
provides two separate queues, each with its own server, while the other seller has a single queue and server. We explore the
market impact of the multi-server seller engaging in waiting cost-based-price discrimination by charging a premium for
express checkout. Specifically, we analyze this situation computationally and through the use of controlled laboratory
experiments. We find that this form of price discrimination is harmful to sellers and beneficial to consumers. When the twoqueue seller offers express checkout for impatient customers, the single queue seller focuses on the patient shoppers
thereby driving down prices and profits while increasing consumer surplus.
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planned for the rest of the day. At the same time one can imagine
the outrage if a poor person died while waiting at the ER for a
wealthy person with a minor scrape to be treated because the latter
was willing and able to pay more.
In some situations, however, people are able to pay for priority –
as in the movies when a patron slips the maı̂tre d’ some cash in
exchange for a quick seating at a premium table. In the naturally
occurring world, Six Flags and other theme parks offer multiple
levels of passes at premium prices which allow holders to avoid
waiting in line, and for nearly double the usual entry price, tourists
can skip the queue when going to the top of the Empire State
Building in New York City. A more celebrated example is variable
priced toll roads, which have become a hot concept for reducing
road congestion. Several U.S. metropolitan areas have converted
High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes over to HOT (High
Occupancy or Toll) lanes. Toll roads use prices to limit access to
the road. On a conventional toll road, there is a single price
regardless of current demand, but with a variable priced toll road
the price is adjusted to reflect congestion. For example, a 10-mile
stretch of the Riverside Freeway (CA 91) in Orange County,
California has variable priced toll lanes, with prices ranging from
$1.20 off peak to $10.00 at peak, operating alongside multiple free
lanes.
In this paper, we employ a computational model and laboratory
experiments to explore a similar concept in a retail environment
where multi-queue sellers use premium pricing for express
checkout. By charging different prices at each queue, retailers
can encourage customers to self-sort according to waiting costs and
perhaps thereby acquire a greater portion of the available surplus.
As opposed to the toll road example, where there is no competition
among highways due to the natural monopoly structure of roads,

Introduction
In many markets there are more customers desiring attention
than can be accommodated at one time, which means that some
customers have to wait, be it in line to checkout at the grocery, on
hold with technical support, or for a table at a restaurant. If
individuals value their time differently, then there is a socially
optimal allocation of scarce queue slots, and traditional first come
first serve queuing will be inefficient. Imagine a crowded bakery on
a Friday morning. For a customer ordering pastries to take to an
important business meeting, waiting in line can be very costly. But
for a customer on vacation and planning to enjoy a pastry while
reading the newspaper and lounging at a table in the bakery,
waiting has a relatively low cost. These arguments are not unique
to service industries; users of communication and transportation
networks also have heterogeneous waiting costs as certain packets
of information and cargo are more time-sensitive than others, and
thus all queuing systems that ignore preference heterogeneity are
inefficient.
In principle, one could introduce market forces to offset these
inefficiencies by allowing high time-cost customers to pay for
priority service, either by paying a premium to the seller or via
transfers to more patient customers further ahead in the line.
However, contracting costs can make such systems difficult to
implement, and other less efficient mechanisms are often used
instead (such as first come first serve at a bakery where people pull
a number). Another alternative is the triage mechanism used in
emergency rooms based on the severity of each individual case.
While few begrudge this practice in the ER, it is doubtful that
people would be as accepting of allowing a baker to decide who
was served first based upon their opinion of what the person had
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have been relatively rare, but see [8] and [9] for experimental
implementations of a market for queue priority with a single
server. In general, previous laboratory work on queuing has
focused on the behavior of customers rather than the sellers
operating the queues, e.g. [10–14]. See also [15] for an experiment
on network congestion.
In the model reported in [2], which is most similar to our setup,
when asymmetric-price, pure-strategy equilibria exist, there also
exists an equilibrium in which sellers charge the same price. To
our knowledge, no one has tested their model in an experimental
setting; however, this may be partly due to the fact that the
differences in prices charged by the two sellers are typically quite
small and would be difficult to distinguish from noise empirically.
Our environment differs from theirs in that our sellers are not
identical. For an extension to a continuum of sellers, see also [16]
and [17], whose discussions of queue price competition differ from
ours in that buyers’ reservation values are assumed to be
sufficiently large that no buyers ever choose not to enter a queue
in equilibrium. Similarly, in a model with identical customers and
general queue structures, but with heterogeneous service rates
rather than waiting costs, [18] prove the existence of mixed
strategy oligopoly equilibria.
Practically speaking, the success of any new pricing policy
depends on how it is perceived by customers [19]. In a well-known
example, Coca-Cola developed a vending machine that would set
prices based upon outside air temperature, but consumer response
was sufficiently negative that the device was never implemented.
On the other hand, overnight shipping and one-hour laundry
service are competitive industries that charge a premium for fast
service; however, it is likely that customers view the price premium
for these services as being justified by the additional effort exerted
by the seller. How customers might perceive a store offering a
premium-priced express checkout line is an interesting question,
but beyond the scope of this paper. We do note that there are two
ways to present differential pricing to consumers: offering a
discount for those who are more flexible and offering express
checkout at a premium for those in a hurry. While offering a
discount to the patient and charging a premium to the impatient
are not distinct from a traditional theoretical perspective, it is easy
to imagine that consumers would view the latter as elitist but have
a favorable view of the former. A similar psychological effect likely
explains why universities often promote their use of merit-based
scholarships, but never advertise that they charge weak students a
higher price even though the two statements convey the same
meaning.
While it is not always explicitly presented as such, one similar
line of research emphasizes the implicit time-cost price discrimination resulting from the practice of offering cents off coupons to
customers; only customers with low opportunity costs of time are
likely to take the time to cut coupons [20]. See [21] and [22] for a
similar argument about rebates; see [23] for a more general
discussion of using product differentiation to encourage customer
self-sorting; and see [24] for a summary of research on price
discrimination in competitive environments. One last important
difference between our setting and the rest of the literature on selfsorting and product differentiation is the presence of externalities
across consumers. By joining a given line, a consumer imposes a
negative externality on other members of the line. A monopoly is
able to internalize some of the externality so as to generate higher
profits. The presence of competition constrains the ability of firms
to internalize this externality. More generally, our paper and this
literature can be viewed as part of the evolving focus on customer
service in marketing (see [25]) and on multi-attribute competition,

or the entertainment examples, where products are highly
differentiated, retail markets are generally competitive markets
offering homogenous goods. Thus, when making pricing decisions,
retailers must take into account not just the response of their
customers, but of their rivals as well. The most closely related
theoretical work to ours is [1–3] who model duopoly markets with
queuing and stochastic arrival of heterogeneous customers where
two identical sellers each control a single server and queue. They
show that under certain conditions pure-strategy equilibria exist in
which identical sellers charge different prices and segment the
market according to waiting cost. So far, however, we know of no
research looking at price discrimination when firms control
multiple queues in a competitive framework.
At first glance, one may think that the provision of high price
and low price queues is just another example of vertical product
differentiation, but there is an important difference. In a classic
problem of vertical product differentiation, quality is either
exogenous or fully under the control of the seller. With queuing,
product quality, i.e. waiting time, is determined endogenously by
the interaction between prices and consumer behavior. Another
departure of our work from these previous papers is that while they
have focused on steady state outcomes, we focus on profitability
over the natural cycle from store opening when all queues are
empty through store closing when no new shoppers arrive but
those already in line continue to be served. Two reasons motivate
such a departure. First, the nature and the properties of the steady
state equilibrium are highly sensitive to parameter choices.
Second, the natural cycle approach is better suited in making
the bridge between the naturally occurring economy and
experiment results.
Compared to current retail practices, price based express
checkout is a step beyond what many multi-line retailers offer in
the form of ‘‘express lines’’ for those purchasing, say, 12 items or
less. The logic of limited quantity queues is that shoppers who are
in a hurry and only want a few items may be unwilling to go to a
large box store for fear of being stuck in long lines behind shoppers
with full carts. These impatient customers may instead choose to
go to smaller convenience stores and pay higher prices for a
quicker shopping experience. Intuitively, price based express
checkout could potentially eliminate a small retailer’s ability to
poach time sensitive customers.
Ultimately, though, our experimental data suggest that allowing
a multi-line seller to offer price based express checkout leads to
lower overall prices in the environment we study. This outcome is
beneficial to consumers and results in lower seller profits, which
may help explain why the practice is not common. The next
subsection of the paper briefly reviews related literature. Then we
present the model that we analyze computationally and describe
the design of our experiments. These allow us to compare pricebased express checkout and uniform pricing along with two
additional treatments – one that offers a more direct test of the
one-shot model’s predictions and one that serves as a check on
subject responsiveness to model parameters. Then we present the
behavioral results, and a final section offers concluding remarks.

Related Literature
[4] provides the first discussion of using prices to regulate the
size of queues, and [5] describes optimal pricing strategies for a
single seller operating multiple queues and serving otherwisehomogeneous customers that have heterogeneous waiting costs.
Similarly, [6] examines single-server queue price discrimination
among heterogeneous customers with asymmetric information,
and [7] applies the logic of congestion pricing to the allocation of
valuable airport landing slots. Experimental study of these issues
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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in which firms compete for customers on price, service time,
quality and so on (see e.g. [26–28]).
Finally, our laboratory implementation builds on a rich
literature on duopoly (and oligopoly) competition in experimental
market settings. [29] summarize the findings from the literature,
but to our knowledge no one has studied either competition or
price discrimination in laboratory queuing systems.

sellers privately and independently set their market prices, which
are fixed for N periods. Let p1 be the price charged by the seller
B
with a single checkout line and let pA
2 and p2 be the prices charged
by the seller operating two lines. Traditional uniform pricing by
B
the two-line seller is captured by the constraint that pA
2 ~p2 , while
B
=p
.
Without
loss of
price based express checkout allows for pA
2
2
B
vp
.
generality, we assume that pA
2
2
The number of arriving shoppers in each period is governed by
a truncated Poisson (l) process. The actual distribution was an
approximation to a Poisson distribution with an upper bound on
the number that could be drawn. This was done to facilitate
participant comprehension in the laboratory experiments discussed later in the paper. In particular, our truncated distribution
can be described visually as shown in Appendix A in File S1. The
computational results are essentially unchanged if one uses a true
Poisson distribution. We normalize the service rate so that it takes
one period to serve one customer. Each shopper values the good at
(has a maximum willingness to pay of) v. A fraction s of shoppers
are impatient and incur a high cost cH for each period spent
waiting to be served. Patient shoppers incur a low cost cL [ ½0,cH )
while waiting. Given the normalization that one shopper is served
at each queue in each period, a shopper’s total wait cost is
proportional to the number of people in line ahead of her when
she joins the line. Three further clarifications are necessary. First,
when the first period begins, there are no shoppers already in line.
This mimics a store opening its doors in the morning. Second,
while multiple customers can arrive in one time interval, the order
in which they consider joining a line is determined randomly. This
is consistent with the interpretation of the Poisson distribution as
governing the number of occurrences of a random process that
occur within a fixed period of time. Third, although there are only
N periods, any shopper in line at the end of period N will
eventually be served. This final point is similar to a store locking its
doors at closing time but allowing those already inside the store to
complete their purchases. A similar rule has been employed in
other experimental studies of duopoly competition with sequential
arrival of buyers (e.g. [30]).
Obviously, the numeric results will depend upon the specific
parameter values that are considered. With no particular industry
or previous research upon which to base the choice of values, any
selection is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. For our simulations
and subsequent laboratory experiments, we implement the
following parameters:

Materials and Methods
We address our problem computationally and with controlled
laboratory experiments. The following subsections describe the
details of our analysis.

Model and Computational Analysis
Traditionally, multi-queue sellers have set prices that are
independent of the checkout line that a shopper uses. However,
a seller who operates multiple queues and multiple servers may
prefer to charge different prices at each queue to exploit
differences in consumers’ waiting costs. Shoppers with higher
waiting costs would be willing to pay a premium in order to avoid
the costs of waiting in line, and thus, the seller can induce
consumers to reveal their type by setting different prices and
allowing shoppers to self-sort, a form of second degree price
discrimination. Therefore, we compare the effects of two policies
on prices, profits and consumer welfare. In one case, a multiqueue, multi-server seller sets a single price for all of its queueserver pairs, and in the second case, the seller may engage in timecost based price discrimination, charging a separate price at each
queue; in practice this is equivalent to a situation where one seller
operates two retail locations and the other seller operates a single
location. The policy question is then whether or not the seller
operating two stores sets the same price at both stores.
We construct a model of market competition between two
sellers offering identical goods to a population of shoppers, who
arrive in the market sequentially. All shoppers want at most one
unit of the good and value it equally. Shoppers only differ in their
cost of waiting to be served. A seller can serve only one customer at
a time for each queue it operates, and the time it takes to service a
customer is fixed. Several features of our markets are simplistic. It
is unlikely that all consumers have identical values for a product or
that service times are identical. However, these realistic complications are not critical to the aspect of the market that is under
investigation. Moreover, our model and experimental/computational environment provide a foundation for testing future
hypotheses about the impact of these variables.
Shoppers enter queues optimally to maximize their surplus.
That is, a shopper compares the value of the item to the total cost
of making a purchase, which includes the price and the time cost
of waiting to be served. If no queue offers a positive surplus to the
shopper, then she balks and does not make a purchase. If some
queue offers a weakly positive surplus to the shopper, then she will
join the queue offering her the greatest surplus, with any tie broken
randomly. Recent technological advances, such as smart phones,
make acquiring such information more feasible than it may at first
appear, e.g. one can currently search online for real-time
information on areas of traffic congestion in most major cities.
With the explosion of mobile computing and data sharing the
ability to access such information will be enhanced. Under this
setup, customers never renege because waiting times are
deterministic, and thus if it was optimal to join the line, it is
never optimal to leave it.
Formally, we consider a duopoly situation in which one seller
controls two queues and the other controls a single line. Both
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

1. N~60
2. l~2
3. v~10
4. s~0:5
5. cL ~0
6. cH ~2
The values of cL and s were set for simplicity in both the
simulations and the market experiments; v and cH only matter in
relation to each other and cL . We set N with an eye towards the
experiments. In particular, each period lasts one second and thus
N = 60 corresponds to a minute in real time. l~2 is chosen so that
a queue will build if there is a unique low price seller but there is
excess service capacity in the market.
To explore optimal behavior, we perform a grid search over
B
A
(p1 ,pA
2 ,p2 ) [ Z½1,10|Z½1,10|Z½p2 ,10 to compute empirical
best response functions for each seller. The grid reflects the fact
that sellers were required to set integer prices and were not
allowed to set prices at 0; nor were they allowed to set prices above
3
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the maximum willingness to pay of the buyers as prices equal to 0
or greater than v yield zero profit. For each possible price triple,
we simulate 2000 realizations of 60 periods and calculate the
average profit to each seller.
Figure 1 shows the best response curves for each seller with
uniform pricing. Notice that both sellers have a one-dimensional
best response given that each sets a single price. In a strict sense, as
only integer prices are allowed (both in the simulation and the
accompanying experiment), the best responses are the markers
that appear in Figure 1. The lines are added to help visualize the
relationships. Solid lines denote a continuation of a strategy (to
undercut or poach) whereas dashed lines indicate a change in
strategy. In the uniform pricing case, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium (i.e. the best response curves do not coincide). Both
sellers prefer to undercut their rival by one unless their rival is
charging a sufficiently low price in which case it is optimal to set a
price of 10 and poach impatient shoppers. As shown in Figure 1,
there is an asymmetry in how low a seller is willing to price, with
the single-line seller willing to price as low as 5 and the two-line
seller only willing to go as low as 7. To determine the Nash
equilibrium of this game, we first eliminate all of the dominated
pure strategies (ex: the single line seller setting a price less than 5).
Given this reduced game it is then straightforward to calculate the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The result is that the single line
seller should set a price of 5 with approximately probability 0.06, a
price of 7 with probability 0.90, and a price of 9 with probability
0.04. The two-line seller should charge a price of 6 on both lines
with approximately probability 0.49, a price of 8 on both lines with
probability 0.19, and a price of 10 with probability 0.32. Table 1
summarizes pricing under the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the two-line seller would expect to earn approximately $451 for each 60-period market day.
When the two-line seller can price discriminate, that seller has a
best response surface, which would result in a three-dimensional

Table 1. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Prices by
Treatment.

Price
(Probability)
Uniform

Discriminatory

One-Line Seller

5

7

(0.06)

(0.90)

9
(0.04)

Two-Line Seller

6, 6

8, 8

10, 10

(0.49)

(0.19)

(0.32)

One-Line Seller

4

6

8

(0.62)

(0.30)

(0.08)

Two-Line Seller

5, 8

7, 8

10, 10

(0.60)

(0.23)

(0.17)

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t001

figure. In general, the single-line seller prefers to undercut its rival
unless the minimum price offered by the rival is very low, as with
uniform pricing. The two-line seller’s best response is generally to
undercut the single-line seller’s price with one line and charge a
premium at the other line. As in the uniform pricing case, there is
no pure strategy equilibrium. While the size and nature of the
reduced game is more complicated in this case, one can again
calculate the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium treating each price
pair the two-line seller could charge as a strategy. To solve for the
equilibrium we used Gambit [31]. In equilibrium, the single-line
firm will set its price at 4, 6, and 8 with probabilities of
approximately 0.62, 0.30, and 0.08, respectively. The two-line
seller will set price pairs of (5,8), (7,8), and (10,10) with
probabilities of approximately 0.60, 0.23, and 0.17 respectively;
see Table 1 for a summary. In equilibrium, the two-line seller

Figure 1. Best Response Functions when Express Checkout Premium is Not Possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.g001
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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would expect to earn approximately $447, or 1% less than when
price discrimination is not possible, and this is driven by the lower
average prices charged in the discriminatory case. Thus, it appears
that rather than being profitable, the ability to price discriminate
by offering premium express checkout actually harms the two-line
seller, albeit minimally. Why, then, does the two-line seller not
simply set the same price at both lines? This is because he always
has an incentive to use one line to undercut the price set by the
one-line seller, ensuring that he can sell to all the patient shoppers
while still exploiting some impatient customers with the higher
priced line. Without the ability to price discriminate the two-line
seller is forced to do one or the other.
To check the robustness of our analysis, we replicate the
simulations with cH [ f1,3g,s [ f0:4,0:6g, and l [ f1,3g, varying
each parameter in isolation. The basic results are similar, and we
find no pure strategy equilibria under any of these parameterizations. However, it is worth noting that if the proportion of
shoppers who are impatient (s) is sufficiently low, the situation
reduces to Bertrand competition.
Finally, for completeness we point out that, with our baseline
parameters, a three-line monopolist forced to set a uniform price
would optimally charge 10 at each line, and a three-line firm that
was allowed to set different prices at each line would have one line
priced at 9 and two priced at 10. This simple change would
increase monopoly profit by over 18% because it reduces balking
by impatient shoppers. This latter outcome is the joint profitmaximizing collusive strategy, which can be achieved in two ways
B
under Discriminatory, p1 ,(pA
2 ,p2 )~10,(9,10) and 9,(10,10), and
B
in only one way under Uniform, p1 ,(pA
2 ,p2 )~9,(10,10).

also examine a random re-matching protocol, which is more
appropriate for a strict test of the one-shot model.
Subject sellers set their prices at the beginning of a market. Each
period was one second and therefore a market lasted just over one
minute since any customers already in line at the end of the 60th
period continued to be served at the rate of one per second. Once
prices were set, both sellers could observe current prices and were
shown buyers arriving in the market. Figure 2 shows the screen
interface. A buyer in line was represented by a stick figure. Those
buyers standing beside the image of a cash register are in the
queue, and thus sellers could determine how long each line was at
any point. How many shoppers arrived each period, how many
joined each queue, and how many shoppers balked was displayed
on the lower right of the subject screen. Also available to subject
sellers was a historical record that showed previous prices and
earnings by market. Sellers intentionally were not informed of the
wait cost of a particular shopper because this information is not
available to sellers in naturally occurring retail markets. To reduce
variation across sessions, a single set of approximately 4800
realizations (40 markets660 periods per market6an expectation of
l~2 buyers per period) of buyers was used in every duopoly. This
practice helps ensure that differences between sessions are
generated by the treatments and endogenous differences in pricing
behavior.
We conducted two additional experiments to provide further
insight into these markets. The first of these, called the Random
treatment, replicates the Discriminatory experiment except that
sellers are randomly and anonymously re-matched after each 60
period market, though subjects retain their roles as either one-line
or two-line sellers throughout. As mentioned above, this procedure
offers a cleaner test of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which
is developed as a one shot game ignoring any strategic implications
of current behavior on future outcomes. In particular, repetition
allows for reputation building and the threat of future punishment
of non-cooperative behavior. The folk theorem implies that any set
of strategies that generates profits for both players in excess of the
one shot Nash equilibrium can also be supported as a Nash
equilibrium in the repeated game when players have sufficiently
low discount rates. In our setting this means that Discriminatory
should lead to prices weakly between the one-shot equilibrium
level and the monopoly level. Since the ability to punish noncooperative behavior in the future is eliminated in Random,
behavior is hypothesized to coincide with the one shot Nash
equilibrium. Thus, prices in Discriminatory are hypothesized to be
weakly greater than those in Random.
The second additional experiment, called the Patient treatment,
also replicates the Discriminatory treatment except that all
customers are patient (i.e. s = 0) and so will always simply join
the lowest priced line. Casual introspection yields that Bertrand
competition should drive all prices down to their minimum (1) in
the one shot game and that the monopoly outcome is to charge a
price of 10 at every line. Thus, with the repeated play (fixed
pairings) employed in the Patient treatment, the folk theorem
implies that any price could be charged by at all three lines in
equilibrium. Still, it seems reasonable to suppose that the
elimination of impatient customers will lead to lower prices. Thus,
this treatment is designed to verify that our sellers are responsive to
shopper characteristics.
The experiments were conducted in the Behavioral Business
Research Laboratory at the University of Arkansas. Participants
were recruited randomly from the lab’s database of undergraduate
volunteers. A common, but nave, criticism of laboratory experiments that involve undergraduates is that the subjects lack the
sophistication necessary to understand the problem. First, theo-

Experimental Design and Procedures
Ethics Statement. This study was conducted with the
approval of the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Arkansas. All experiments were conducted with the informed
consent of 48 healthy adult subjects who were free to withdraw
from participation at any time. Only individuals who voluntarily
entered the experiment recruiting database were invited, and
informed consent was obtained in writing prior to the beginning of
each experimental session.
To further explore the impact of sellers charging for express
checkout, we turn to a two-treatment, between subjects controlled
laboratory experiment. In the experiment, human subjects
participated as sellers while buyers were operationalized as
truthfully revealing robots. This approach is justified because we
study a setting in which buyers do not have market power and do
not make repeated purchasing decisions [32]. Subjects were
randomly assigned to be either a one-line seller or a two-line seller
and retained that role throughout the experiment. The two main
treatments are distinguished by whether the two-line seller is
forced to charge a single price for both of his queues (Uniform
treatment) or not (Discriminatory treatment). Subjects were
randomly and anonymously matched with a seller in the other
role and interacted with that person for the entire session which
consisted of 40 markets, each lasting N = 60 periods. Twelve
subjects were in the laboratory at one time so that no one could
identify who their rival was. The treatment was fixed for the entire
session. The fixed matching procedure and N were common
information, but the number of markets was not. The subjects also
had complete information regarding the parameters presented in
the previous section. As argued in [33], maintaining fixed
matching more closely replicates naturally occurring markets, as
few sellers ever interact with their rival only once. Given our
interest in the applied problem, we chose to implement a fixed
matching protocol for our main experiment. As described later, we
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 2. Subject Seller Interface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.g002

retical models such as the one developed here are silent as to the
identity of the decision-maker and only specify that it is attempting
to maximize its profit. Second, this critique wrongly assumes that it
is the absolute level of behavior that is relevant and not the
comparative static effect between treatments. It is true that a
laboratory market will not generate the same prices as another
market (naturally occurring or inside the lab) with different
parameters. It is also true that knowing the price in a naturally
occurring market, such as the one for consumer package goods,
will not inform you of the price for other items such as clothes.
Unless the sophistication and experience of the decision maker is
expected to have differential effect across treatments, then the
comparative static effects are robust to such changes. Finally, when
researchers have explicitly compared sophisticated subjects and
undergraduates, the behavioral differences are often quite small
(see for example, [34] studying asset market trading, [35] in
common value auctions outside the familiar domain of the experts,
and [36] for myopic loss aversion among traders).
Six distinct seller pairs competed in each of the Uniform,
Discriminatory, and Patient treatments. An additional twelve
subjects participated in the Random treatment. On average,
sessions lasted one hour. Each subject received a payment of $5 for
arriving to the session on time. Subjects were also paid based upon
their profits in the experiment. All prices, costs, and values in the
market were denoted in Lab Dollars, which were converted into
USD at the end of the experiment at a rate of 150 Lab Dollars = 1
USD for two-line sellers and 100 Lab Dollars = 1 USD for one-line
sellers. Average salient earnings in the experiment were $9.68 with
a high of $20.25 and a low of $4.00, not including the arrival
payment. File S1 contains the experiment instructions and a
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Table 2. Average Per Period Summary Statistics, by
Treatment, markets 21–40.

p1
pA
2
pB2
p1

p2

Price Paid

(1)

(2)

Uniform

Discriminatory Random

Patient

6.55

4.88

3.89

3.65

(1.97)

(1.97)

(1.50)

(2.49)

7.21

4.78

3.52

3.95

(2.07)

(1.85)

(1.40)

(2.42)

–

6.50

4.85

4.49

(1.60)

(1.53)

(2.88)

213.16

145.69

181.45

300.29

(4)

(142.59)

(90.67)

(63.68)

(203.20)

488.08

364.79

283.19

209.94

(152.78)

(142.46)

(80.67)

(240.21)

6.66

4.83

3.64

3.25

(1.90)

(1.69)

(0.87)

(2.06)

Buyer Surplus 533.83

Number
Balking

(3)

732.94

886.35

972.13

(226.22)

(196.94)

(104.62)

(265.16)

1.34

0.37

0.06

NA

(2.50)

(1.56)

(0.28)

Standard deviations in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t002
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discrimination. This result is despite the fact that the multi-line
seller could opt to not engage in price discrimination by simply
setting a single price at both lines. Further, consumer welfare is
greater when the two-queue sellers offer price based express
checkout. The buyer result is not tautologically equivalent to the
seller result, because higher prices can reduce queue length and
thus wait costs. Below, we provide details on these two main
findings.
FINDING 1: Price based express checkout lowers market prices
and reduces seller profits.
Evidence: Figure 3 displays time series (market periods 1–40) of
mean prices charged by queue, averaged across all duopolies in
each treatment. We observe notable changes in pricing behavior
over time in the first half of the experiment before behavior
stabilizes over the last half, so our analysis hereafter focuses
exclusively on the last half of the experiment. Our main
conclusions comparing the Uniform and Discriminatory treatments are robust to using the entire dataset, but in comparing the
Discriminatory treatment to the Patient and Random treatments,
the early price variation displayed in panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3

comprehension quiz administered to ensure participants understood the instructions.

Results
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all four treatments. The
results are presented in four subsections. The first two focus on the
main treatment comparison – Discriminatory vs Uniform. In the
first subsection we focus on the aggregate effects of the treatment
variable while the second subsection examines role-specific
behavior. The third subsection reports the results of the Random
treatment and compares those to both the theoretical prediction
and the observed behavior in Discriminatory. The fourth
subsection reports the results of the Patient treatment.

Aggregate Treatment Effects between Discriminatory
and Uniform
We find that when multi-line sellers are prohibited from
engaging in price based express checkout, prices and profits are
higher than when sellers can engage in this form of price

Figure 3. Time Series of Prices by Treatment. Averaged across sessions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.g003
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Table 3. GLS Random Effects Regressions Showing Mean Session-Level Treatment Effects, Uniform vs. Discriminatory, markets
21–40.

Discriminatory

Constant

Observations
2

R

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Price Charged

Profit

Price Paid

Buyer Surplus

# Balking

21.603**

2210.425**

21.828**

199.117**

20.975

(0.734)

(93.286)

(0.828)

(90.892)

(0.747)

6.989***

788.375***

6.662***

533.825***

1.342**

(0.562)

(64.200)

(0.589)

(66.745)

(0.682)

240

240

240

240

240

0.182

0.207

0.207

0.182

0.0524

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pair level.
Statistical significance designated as follows:
*pv0:10,
**pv0:05,
***pv0:01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t003

leads to qualitatively different conclusions than those we reach
when we restrict attention to the last 20 periods. We will discuss
these differences in more detail below. Clearly evident from the
two top panels of the figure is the fact that mean prices charged,
computed over all three lines, are higher in the Uniform treatment
than in the Discriminatory treatment (6.99 vs. 5.39, respectively).
Moreover, mean profits are 394 Lab Dollars/market in the
Uniform treatment and 289 Lab Dollars/market in the Discriminatory treatment. These comparisons are supported by panel
regressions reported in Table 3.
Columns (1) and (2) report regression analysis where the
dependent variables are the mean price charged by sellers and the
total profit, respectively, in each market of each session. In both
specifications, as well as the other three discussed below, the
independent variables are a constant term and a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 in the Discriminatory treatment and 0
otherwise. We include random effects for each session to control
for repeated measures and report heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors. We employ random effects rather than fixed
effects because we observe each pair in only one treatment. In
columns (1) and (2), the estimated coefficients of the Discriminatory treatment dummy variable are both negative and significant
(p-valuesv0.05) indicating that the ability to implement a
premium express checkout policy is harmful to sellers.
We now turn to the buyers’ side of the market where we find
that price based express checkout is beneficial to consumers.
FINDING 2: Consumer welfare is higher with price based
express checkout.
Evidence: As with Finding 1, we report summary statistics and
estimate treatment effects using panel regressions that account for
the repeated measures nature of our data. In Finding 1, we
computed the mean price charged by sellers, but to understand the
effects on consumer welfare, one should compute the mean price
paid by buyers, which will differ because buyers sort according to
their waiting costs and will buy from the lowest priced seller ceteris
paribus. Over the second half of the experiment, markets 21–40,
the mean price paid is higher in the Uniform treatment than the
Discriminatory treatment (6.66 vs. 4.83). Similarly, consumer
surplus is higher in the Discriminatory treatment than in the
Uniform treatment (733 vs. 534 Lab Dollars/market).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report panel regression analysis
in support of the evidence presented above. Column (5) looks for
evidence that price based express checkout benefits consumers by
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

reducing balking. In columns (3)–(5) the dependent variables are
the mean price paid, total buyer surplus, and the number of buyers
that balk in each market of each session, respectively. Again, we
include session-specific random effects, and we estimate heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. A negative and significant
estimated coefficient on the treatment dummy in equation (3)
supports the claim that consumers pay lower prices in the
Discriminatory treatment, and a positive and significant coefficient
in equation (4) indicates that buyers earn more surplus (both pvaluesv0.05). An insignificant estimated coefficient of the
treatment dummy in column (5) indicates no statistically significant
difference in balking when discrimination is possible. Taken
together, the evidence strongly supports the claim that buyers are
better off under a regime of price based express checkout.
While price discrimination is typically understood to result in a
net transfer of surplus from buyers to sellers, we observe the
opposite effect due to the competitive pressure applied by the oneline seller on the two-line seller’s lower priced queue.

Firm-Type Specific Treatment Effects between
Discriminatory and Uniform
Why does the ability to engage in price discrimination harm
sellers? The answer can be found in the top two panels of Figure 3.
Observe that in the Uniform treatment, the two-line seller sets very
high prices and those prices are higher than the price set by the
one-line seller. Recall that the monopoly price, that is the price
that would be charged if one seller operated all three queues, is 10,
the same as the buyer’s value. In such a situation, a price cut by
the two-line seller has a large negative impact on its profitability
because it is no longer able to charge impatient people a high
price. By contrast, if the two-line seller can engage in price
discrimination, then it can lower one of its prices in an attempt to
take market share from the one-line seller while maintaining a high
price at its second queue to continue exploiting impatient
shoppers. This is exactly the pattern that is observed in the top
right hand panel of Figure 3, where the single-queue seller is
competing heavily with the lower-priced of the two-queue seller’s
lines. As a result of the competition, the premium price at the twoline seller is reduced too.
Not being able to discriminate increases the cost of competing
for patient consumers by aggressively lowering prices. A uniform
price acts as a disciplining device. Behaviorally, if the two-line
seller could credibly commit not to engage in price discrimination
8
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then it would prefer to do so, thereby raising profits; however, for
whatever price the single-line seller charges, the two-line seller
would prefer to engage in price discrimination. This phenomenon
is similar to the temptation to defect in a prisoner’s dilemma game
despite the fact that cooperation is jointly preferred. The tendency
of sellers to engage in tacit collusion is a well-known finding in
repeated duopoly games (See e.g. [29,37,38]); however, in our
experiment if firms collude, whichever firm is able to charge a
price of 9 will serve the bulk of the customers and thus earn the
lion’s share of the profits and the two lines setting a price of 10 will
attract only impatient customers when the low price queue is long.
So the incentives to undercut are strong in this environment. This
deterrent to collusion is amplified in the Discriminatory treatment
where there is a coordination problem to determine which firm
will charge the lower price. Higher prices in the Uniform
treatment provide evidence that cooperation may be simpler the
fewer variables that must be coordinated. That is, it may be easier
for the two sellers to collude when there are only two prices instead
of three.
To verify this type specific pattern statistically, we estimate the
difference in behavior between the Uniform and Discriminatory
treatments. Separate linear panel regressions are conducted for
each seller type. For one-line sellers, we estimate a single model
where the dependent variable is the price charged by seller i in
market t. For the two-line firms, we estimate three different
models: in the first, the dependent variable is the mean price
charged over both lines; in the second, the dependent variable is
the lower of the two prices charged; and in the third, the
dependent variable is the higher of the two prices. In the Uniform
treatment, the higher and lower price are the same, so these will
allow us to estimate whether the two-line Uniform sellers price
closer to the high or low price charged by Discriminatory sellers.
In all of the models the independent variables are a Discriminatory
treatment dummy variable and a constant term. We include
random effects for each seller to control for repeated measurements and we estimate heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Table 4 reports the regression output. In the regression
comparing one-line sellers reported in column (1), a negative
and significant estimated coefficient on the Discriminatory
treatment dummy indicates that one-line firms charge significantly
higher prices in the Uniform treatment. Comparing two-line

Table 5. GLS Random Effects Regressions Showing FirmLevel Price Comparisons, Discriminatory (Fixed) vs. Random,
markets 21–40.

(1)
Price Charged

p1
Discriminatory 21.675**

Constant

Observations
2

R

(2)
B
pA
2 zp2
2
21.567**

(3)

(4)

pA
2

pB2

22.425***

20.050

(0.814)

(0.732)

(0.843)

(0.730)

6.550***

7.208***

7.208***

6.550***

(0.606)

(0.560)

(0.560)

(0.606)

240

240

240

240

0.154

0.155

0.277

0.0002

High Price Line

1.625**
(0.665)

Low Price Line

20.092
(0.816)

Random6High

20.667
(0.759)

Random6Low

20.283

Constant

4.875***

(0.875)

(0.533)
Observations

720

R2

0.247

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm.
Statistical significance designated as follows:
*(p,0.10),
**(p,0.05),
***(p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t005

sellers, column (2) reports that mean prices are lower in the
Discriminatory treatment, and columns (3) and (4) indicate that
this effect is primarily driven by the fact that prices are competed
down significantly at the lower priced of the two lines.

Testing the Theoretical Predictions with the Random
Treatment
While it is an equilibrium of the repeated game in the
Discriminatory treatment for the sellers to play the one-shot
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in each stage game, the Folk
theorem implies there are other mutually beneficial (for the sellers)
pricing strategies that could be sustained in equilibrium. Thus, the
Random treatment, which eliminates the repeated play aspect of
the game, is a cleaner test for equilibrium behavior and prices are
expected to be weakly lower in Random as compared to
Discriminatory.
To investigate these two comparisons, we estimate a linear
panel regression where the dependent variable is the price charged
at line j by seller i in market t and the independent variables are a
constant term, a dummy variable for the Random treatment, a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the price was set at a twoline seller’s higher priced line and 0 otherwise, a similar dummy
for the lower priced line of a two line seller, and interaction terms
between the Random treatment and the higher price and lower
price dummy variables. Thus, the baseline case captured by the
constant term is the price of the single-line seller in the
Discriminatory treatment. We include random effects for each
seller to control for repeated measurements, and we estimate
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Table 5 reports the regression output for comparing the fixed
and random rematching protocols when premium express
checkout is possible. The estimated coefficient on the Random

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pair level.
Statistical significance designated as follows:
*pv0:10,
**pv0:05,
***pv0:01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t004
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20.983*
(0.569)

Table 4. GLS Random Effects Regressions Showing FirmLevel Treatment Effects, Uniform vs. Discriminatory, markets
21–40.

(1)

Random

9

March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e92070

Paying for Express Checkout

treatment dummy is negative and marginally significant. This
provides some evidence that repeated interactions can lead to
higher prices in this setting, although we also note that prices
remain far below the collusive level even with repeated play. The
interactions between Random and the dummies for High and Low
Price lines are not statistically different from 0 indicating that
relative prices are not impacted by repeated play, which casts
further doubt on the idea that sellers are colluding in Discriminatory.
We now turn to the question of how well the mixed strategy
equilibrium of our model predicts behavior in this situation. The
evidence suggests that neither the Random nor the Discriminatory
treatment exhibits prices consistent with the theoretical predictions. Specifically, the expected price at each line in equilibrium
based upon the mixing distribution presented above is
B
p1 ~4:9,pA
2 ~6:3, and p2 ~8:3. In the Discriminatory (Fixed)
treatment
the
average
observed
prices
were
B
~4:78,
and
p
~6:50
and
in
the
Random
treatment
p1 ~4:88,pA
2
2
B
they were p1 ~3:89,pA
2 ~3:52, and p2 ~4:85. For completeness,
average
prices
in
the
Uniform
treatment
were
B
p1 ~6:55 and pA
2 ~p2 ~7:21. A Wald test rejects the joint
hypothesis that the observed prices match the equilibrium
predictions in both the Discriminatory and Random treatments
(x2 = 20.74 and 198.74, respectively, p-valuesv0.01). As compared to the theoretical prediction, it appears the sellers are too
competitive, a result similar to [39] that also uses posted offer
market experiments to explore pricing strategies in retail markets.
To test whether the finding above is driven by outliers and to
determine how many individual sellers chose prices consistent with
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) over the last 20
markets, we estimate a separate OLS regression for each seller in
the Discriminatory and Random treatments where the dependent
variable is price charged and the independent variable(s) are (1) for
one-line sellers, a constant term, and (2) for two-line sellers, a
constant term and a high-priced line dummy variable. After each
regression, we perform F-tests: (1) of the hypothesis that for one
line sellers that the estimated coefficient on the constant term is
equal to 4.9, and (2) of the joint hypothesis for two-line sellers that
the estimated coefficient on the constant term is equal to 6.3 and
the sum of the estimated coefficients on the constant term and the
high-priced dummy is equal to 8.3. If we are able to reject the null
hypothesis here, we have evidence that an individual seller
charged a mean price that was inconsistent with the mixed
strategy; the data indicate that only 3/12 sellers in the
Discriminatory treatment and 1/12 sellers in the Random
treatment charged prices consistent with the MSNE, suggesting
that deviation is systematic and not driven by outliers. An
analogous analysis indicates that 3/12 sellers in the Uniform
treatment follow the MSNE there.

Table 6. GLS Random Effects Regressions Showing FirmLevel Price Comparisons, Discriminatory (Fixed) vs. Patient,
markets 21–40 in Col. 1 and markets 1–20 in Col. 2.

Patient

High Price Line

Low Price Line

Patient6High

Patient6Low

Constant

(2)

Price Charged

Price Charged

21.225

22.033***

(0.905)

(0.710)

1.625**

1.900***

(0.665)

(0.488)

20.092

20.125

(0.816)

(0.669)

20.783

21.425

(1.405)

(0.898)

0.392

20.017

(1.325)

(0.975)

4.875***

4.692***

(0.533)

(0.450)

Observations

720

720

R2

0.143

0.390

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm.
Statistical significance designated as follows:
*(p,0.10),
**(p,0.05),
***(p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.t006

previous subsection except that the dummy variable for the
Random treatment is replaced by a dummy variable for the
Patient treatment. Again, the baseline for comparison captured by
the constant term is the price of a single line seller in the
Discriminatory treatment. We include random effects for each
seller to control for repeated measurements and we cluster
standard errors at the session level (i.e. at the level of each
seller-pair).
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients
for the Patient treatment dummy variable and the interaction
terms involving the Patient treatment are statistically insignificant.
This appears to suggest that the manipulation check was
unsuccessful. However, inspection of Figure 3 tells a different
story. Over the first few periods, subjects in Patient quickly
compete prices down close to the theoretical prediction resulting in
low profits. After experiencing this outcome many subjects begin
to actively collude and raise their prices.
Figure 4 shows the behavior of each pair in the Patient
treatment. In session 1, after gradually falling prices and profits for
the first half of the experiment, the single line seller unilaterally
raises his price leading the two-line firm to follow. Sessions 2, 4,
and 5 show similar patterns while sessions 3 and 6 show
competitive behavior with a few price spikes that can be
interpreted as failed attempts to encourage collusion.
If one reruns the estimation comparing the Patient and
Discriminatory treatments using data from market periods 1–20
instead of the second half of the experiment, the results are very
different (see Table 6). In the early periods, prices are indeed lower
on average in the Patient treatment, consistent with the
comparative statics predictions of the model. This result indicates
that subjects are reacting as expected to the customer characteristics in this market and that sellers understand the environment.

Results of Manipulation Check – Patient Treatment
In the Patient treatment, all buyers simply select the lowest price
line, no one will balk, and line length is irrelevant. This essentially
creates Bertrand competition and all prices should be set to one in
the one shot game. Playing the one-shot Nash equilibrium leads to
very low profits for both sellers. The repeated nature of interaction
supports other mutually beneficial price combinations, so while
one would expect lower prices in the Patient treatment than in the
Discriminatory treatment due to the change in buyer values, the
returns to successful collusion also differ. To compare behavior
between treatments, we estimate a linear panel regression where
the dependent variable is the price charged at line j by seller i. The
independent variables are as in the regression reported in the
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 4. Time Series of Prices by Session, Patient treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092070.g004

service. [40] argue that price dispersion in the airline industry may
be partly driven by frequent flyer programs. See [41] for an
empirical estimate of the switching costs imposed by frequent flyer
programs. The examples given earlier of HOT lanes and Six Flags
passes are from essentially monopoly markets. There are also some
seemingly forgone discrimination opportunities among monopoly
providers. For example, some spectators at a ballgame (ourselves
included) would likely be willing to pay an even higher price for
beer if it meant avoiding a long line in the concourse while missing
the game. We do not normally observe restaurants (formally)
allowing customers to pay for priority seating or mass retailers
operating more than twenty registers offering a faster checkout line
at a higher price. This form of time based price discrimination is
distinct from package shippers, film developers, and dry cleaners

The observed behavior is in line with previous Bertrand
competition experiments, which have found that sellers are
typically competitive, but rarely so competitive that they push
prices (and profits) all the way down to the predicted level (see the
discussion of posted offer market experiments in [29]).

Discussion
When we began this project, we were struck by the puzzling
rarity of time-cost based price discrimination in situations where
customers have to physically queue for service in competitive
markets. Exceptions, such as priority boarding for travelers on an
airline, prove the rule since many of these customers have earned
their status by repeatedly flying on a single airline and essentially
giving the chosen airline market power in exchange for priority
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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offering faster completion times for a higher price, as these services
can be viewed as different goods and the process occurs after the
transaction.
One initially plausible reason for the absence of time-cost price
discrimination is that people might be offended by such practices
(for a general discussion of customer acceptance of various polices
see e.g. [19]). Interestingly, [42], who interviewed two hundred
firms in relation to their pricing practices, reveals that the most
frequent reason for keeping price stable was to avoid ‘‘antagonizing or causing difficulties to customers’’. However, as the toll road
and amusement park examples suggest, such moral concerns are
not always a deterrent to discriminatory pricing. Moreover,
customer distaste would likely be reduced or eliminated as
shoppers came to realize they were made better off by the practice
at exactly the point at which it is most important to them, i.e. when
their time is most valuable.
Our experimental findings suggest an alternative reason why
time cost price discrimination, such as paying a premium for
express checkout, is rare: when sellers are in direct competition for
customers, queue price discrimination can be harmful to the sellers
and industries that employ it. This finding is similar to that in [43]
who find that coupon-based price discrimination can be harmful
to firms in oligopolistic industries and to [44] who find that price
discrimination can lead to lower prices and profits in markets with
switching costs. Specifically, we find that average posted prices are
lower when the multi-line seller cannot engage in price discrimination. This change is relatively small theoretically, but substantial behaviorally. As a result of the changing posted prices
associated with allowing wait cost based price discrimination by
the multi-line seller, average paid prices fall, reducing profits and
increasing consumer surplus. Uniform pricing across queues by the
multi-line seller appears to be more profitable when there is a mix
of patient and impatient customers because it forces the multi-line
seller to abandon the impatient customers when pursuing the
patient ones. In contrast, with discrimination the multi-line seller
can attempt to capture both markets, which leads the single-line
rival to price more aggressively. This drives down the price for
patient shoppers, which in turn limits the premium that impatient
customers are forced to pay. As predicted by the model and
demonstrated in a separate experiment, when all customers are
patient the marketplace becomes very competitive and prices fall,
at least initially.
Our main findings are based upon the situation where rivals
interact repeatedly for an indefinite horizon. While this is more

reflective of the naturally occurring world, the threat of future
punishment can theoretically support cooperation. Thus, we
conducted an additional experiment where each interaction was
one-shot in order to give the model its best shot. We find only
marginal evidence of a difference between the repeated game and
the one-shot game. This suggests that collusion may not be as
problematic in more complicated market games as it is in simpler
duopoly games or prisoner’s dilemma games more generally (see
[29] for a discussion). Added complexity may also explain why
collusion is rarely observed in repeated games with more than
three players (see for example [38].
Our work contributes to the already rich literature on multiattribute competition in which sellers compete on both price and
service time (see Related Literature above). At the same time, we
believe that our work suggests several important new directions for
research in retail economics. For example, we treat the number of
queues that each seller operates as exogenous, but this decision is
ultimately endogenous and can be varied with the expected
demand such as when a large grocery hires fewer cashiers for the
late night shift. Another extension that advances in technology will
likely facilitate is the ability to dynamically adjust the price of
express checkout with queue length, something akin to the toll
pricing on CA 91.
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